Wittgenstein considers the inner being as a delusion since it has no existence per se. The inner being is not visible as an object could be and so it cannot be considered in language expositions. When you say a cat, you see it, in your imagination. It exists thus. But when you said “a mind”, you don’t see it in the same way. You only seen a man who has the capability of thinking, intelligence, and who is capable of feeling about the world around him. When you say a well-sculpted body, you immediately see such a body in your imagination. But when you say an intelligent mind, there is a struggle in your mind in imagining it. You have to substitute intelligent mind with an intelligent face, that of a writer, a chess player, a smart engineer in your locality, a clever lawyer, a topper in college, an intellectual and so on. The inner being is a delusion since it cannot come to our mind without a substitution. It always needs a “body suit”. Now this “body suit” is not the inner being also.
This is why when we say a fast bowler such as Bumrah has a good head over his shoulders we don’t mean that we have seen his smartness, his solid temperament and intelligence, quite distinctively. No we haven’t. Every time Bumrah makes an error in the cricket field we wonder where that “good head” has gone now. Bumrah’s physical attributes such as his tallness, his gait are there to “see” for all of us. They don’t disappear just like that. They stay put and are quite certain for our appraisal. But again, Bumrah’s tall figure is made tall by the actions that he performs with it; these actions are prompted by his disposition and channelised by his decision making. His gait is a manner of expression that is also born out of his personality and outlook towards life, as body language experts may claim. While the body is certain in the visual domain, it is still bodily because of the inner being. This latter feature is obvious when Bumrah addresses himself - say, when he speaks of an injury, he won’t say that the body has a ligament tear or an injury to the spinal cord. He would say “his” body is hurting on account of the severe injury. When he speaks of his bowling, he may claim that “he” is bowling fast after the recovery. It is not his body that is injured; it is not his body that is bowling fast, but he, the person. At the first instance, the body is attributed by the self ( a good head), and in the next one, his self is attributed by the body (he has an injury).
Coming back to the fever example, let me ask another question:
Why do we not say that “my body has fever” or that “there is fever in my body” but claim that “I have fever”? Is it because when it comes to feverliness our whole being experiences it. But when it comes to an injury its on my forearm, it does not permeate my entire being. So I say that I have an itch in my forearm.
Similarly, when I am upset I say “I am upset” not that “my mind is upset”. But I also say that “my mind is cluttered now”. Why not “my mind”, and why “I am”?
In the first case, the feeling of upset is experienced by my being, but in the second I don’t feel that I cluttered my mind, but that the mind is messed up by itself. So, the body-self binary is tweaked in terms of whether or not we want to claim ownership to a phenomenon with or within us.
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